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The following is based on my remarks on receipt of the 2015 ACE award for outstanding contributions to
epidemiology.A great scientist and dear friend showed me it would be wise to
open with a joke. Structured humor is not my forte. So I practiced
and practiced on people in my office. Until, as an employee-
retention effort, my chair asked me to stop.
So here is the joke: A philosopher and an epidemiologist sit
down next to each other on a flight to DC. The philosopher says to
the epidemiologist: Question everything! The epidemiologist re-
plies: Why?
I was planning to speak on how epidemiology is a ship of
Theseus. Given we are all on this ship together, we learn well by
analogy and the ship is a neat paradox, it seemed appropriate and
fun. But the lunchtime roundtable conversation about “Risk” [1]
yesterday got me thinking. And I would like to take this opportu-
nity to expound on three points. Every communication is
miscommunication. Dogmatists cannot learn. And truth is shared
reality.Every communication is miscommunication
You and I are communicating, right now, over awireless audio or
visual channel. I do not know how to communicate some of the
things I wish to say. And I definitely do not know the correct order
in which to say them for you. There is no generally correct order
because these ideas are not linearly structured. And even if there
were a correct order, I have to use language to communicate these
ideas to you. And language is an imperfect communicationmedium.
Language is a subtle mathematics.gy, Gillings School of Global
ill, Campus Box 7435, ChapelRichard Hamming said, essentially, that the words carry a
message, but the words are not the message; because we could use
other words ([2], page 73). We know the map is not the territory.
The model is not the truth. But triangulation is important. And
every communication is miscommunication.
Dogmatists cannot learn
The proof of this statement is found in the fact that no amount of
evidence can alter a certain belief, also known as a point-mass prior.
The act of holding any belief with certainty is dangerous to rational
thought and knowledge. This fact begs a no-principle principle, or
Jack Good’s principle of nondogmatism ([3], p 30). This principle
appears to be ontologically prior to Aristotle’s first law of thought,
or identity. Bertrand Russell succinctly described Aristotle’s law of
identity as: “Whatever is, is” ([4], p 47). So, the principle of non-
dogmatism might amend Aristotle (respectfully) as: “Whatever is,
is; as far as we can see.”
Dennis Lindley spoke about a principle similar to non-
dogmatism, he called it: Cromwell’s rule ([5], page 104). In 1650,
Oliver Cromwell wrote to the Church of Scotland: “I beseech you, in
the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken.” In a
1960 interview, Russell said something to the effect of: “One should
not be certain, or you are certainly wrong.” This idea can be
illustrated by a computer program with 2 lines. The first line is the
command: Print the remark “Hello world.” The second line is the
command: Goto line 1. This loop is like dogmatism, there is no
release.
But we do run into a little snag that you may have already
anticipated ([6], page 348). Should we be dogmatic about the
principle of nondogmatism? This snag or “Paradox of Non-
dogmatism” reminds me of the Liar paradox: “This statement is
false.” ([7], page 127). Some things may not be knowable. Or at least
not knowable to us, now. This snag set aside, the principle of
nondogmatism appears generally sound. Although skeptics churn
(thankfully), there is resounding agreement by experts that un-
certainties are best quantified by probability. Therefore, to mini-
mize error, we best believe nothing with probability 1, even this
advice.
Nondogmatists can learn. Richard Feynman wrote: “Experiment
is the sole judge of scientific ‘truth’.”([8], page 1e1). I learn starting
with an idealization which is composed of three central parts. First,
we have an extension of Fisher’s experiment [9], which we call
“multiply randomized experiments.” Second, we have Robins’
nonparametric g computation algorithm formula [10], which
I believe is a fundamental theorem of causal inference. Third, we
have Efron’s nonparametric bootstrap [11]. Amazingly, with the
combination of these three ideas, we can learn without parametric
models, in principle. We can nonparametrically identify and esti-
mate well-defined counterfactual risk functions [1], and their
uncertainty. This is a mathematics for causality; it leads toward a
superatomic information- and decision-theoretic counterfactual
probability logic.
But this is an idealization, like the continuum or triangles [12].
And no experiment is ideal. All real-life experiments are broken.
Observational studies can be used to perform pseudoexperiments,
but they are broken by design. And thought experiments often do
not even include physical data. Such realities press us to face the
fundamental problem of causal inference [13]. In trying to address
this fundamental problem, we encounter high dimension settings,
combinatorial explosions, and Bellman’s curse of dimensionality
([14], page ix). These realities appear to require an infinite-
dimension semiparametric theory [15,16], which when combined
with stabilization using a Laplace ([17], page 19) or Good [3] Bayes/
non-Bayes synthesis comprises what we call semi-Bayes semi-
parametric inference. But dogmatists cannot learn.Truth is shared reality
What I can tell you clearly, what I know well, would not be very
interesting tome, and perhaps not to you. But what I cannot tell you
clearly, what I do not (yet) know well, is fascinating. The void be-
tween the known and the unknown; the edge of our understand-
ing. New ideas seem to come from this void, but access is limited
and miscommunications are abundant. Interestingly, irrationality
seems important in creative works. And analogy seems critical to
bridge from what we know to what we do not. So what is “truth?”
First, we might prefer to speak of degrees of truth, measured as
probability, rather than speak of the dichotomy of truth ¼ 1 and
false ¼ 0. These are just the dangerous limits of dogmatism.
Truth is fact or reality, apparently. A fact is something that
occurred or is the case, apparently. Reality is the state of things as
they exist . apparently. From here on, I will omit the caveat
“apparently,” but it holds throughout. Existence, or reality, is that
which persists independent of one’s presence. But humans only
have direct access to their own mind, and indirect access to each
other’s minds by imperfect communication. Therefore, truth can
only be agreed-upon fact, or “a shared reality.” Reality is what we
can perceive and agree upon. Because reality is only what we can
agree upon, consistency is important. Consistency has many
guises, logical and otherwise. In its varied forms, consistency is
central yet impossible to demand completely. Also, checkability
(or empirical verifiability, or testability) is central in principle, but
cannot be dogmatically required in practice. Indeed, many things
are difficult to check, and some things may not be checkable. And
time is short.It remains indeterminate whether we can determine further
epidemiologic truths, or probability laws regarding health and
disease. Successes like smallpox and polio eradication efforts,
smoking and radiation effects, and the treatment of human im-
munodeficiency virus and hepatitis C virus are highly encouraging.
Epidemiologists should be proud. But if there are further such
causal probability laws (I think there are), humans must learn them
using our imperfect rules of thought.
Finally, we might want to guess at what might have been
(the counterfactual), rather than simply learn what is (the
factual). This appears to require metaphysics. Metaphysics are
useful; like the triangle, integers, infinities, real numbers, random
numbers, counterfactuals, and thought experiments. Ultimately,
we all have our own preferences, or utility functions, that must
be coherently combined with counterfactual probabilities to
maximize expected utility, within reason, assuming we wish to
make rational decisions. Interestingly, though (and a hint that I
have something not quite correct), as noted by Good [3], one of us
may stand alone on a point and only be vindicated later, if ever.
Perhaps truth is more than shared reality? Regardless, my access
to truth is only through our shared reality. We must act on what
we learn. We must learn all we can. Truth is shared reality,
apparently.
Last, thank you. I would like to thank Pythagoras, Aristotle,
Newton, Bernoulli, Bayes, Hume, Laplace, Wittgenstein, Neyman,
Fisher, de Finetti, Wald, Ulam, Turing, Good, Cox, Efron, Greenland,
Pearl, and Robins. I would like to thank you, the membership of the
American College of Epidemiology (ACE), the ACE leadership, the
organizing committee for this meeting, and the ACE Awards Com-
mittee. I would like to thank my teachers, my students, my
colleagues, and, especially, my family. Thank you, I am honored to
receive this award.
Postscript regarding fundamental theorems: Counterfactual
existence, consistency and exchangeability (or permutability)
may be ontologically prior to the g formula, but each is perhaps
too simple to be a fundamental theorem. Perhaps a fundamental
theorem should relate seemingly unrelated features
(e.g., fundamental theorem of calculus). The g formula relates
the factual and counterfactual.
Postscript regarding the paradox of nondogmatism: If we are
dogmatic about nondogmatism, thenwe fail to be nondogmatic.
But if we are not dogmatic about nondogmatism, then some-
times we fail to be nondogmatic. This paradox might be
undecidable like whether or not induction is valid, or at what
level of our decision hierarchy to stop being overtly rational
([18], page 11).
Postscript regarding miscommunications: Miscommunications
can be meaningful. Please do not read extreme pessimism into
my message. Please do not take away the idea that communi-
cation is meaningless. If we are completely skeptical, then we
are dogmatic. By the way, while we are on this topic, do nihilists
believe in nihilism?References
[1] Cole SR, Hudgens MG, Brookhart MA, et al. Risk. Am J Epidemiol
2015;181(4):246e50.
[2] Hamming RW. The art of doing science and engineering: learning to learn.
Amsterdam: Gordan and Breach Science; 1997.
[3] Good IJ. Good thinking. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press; 1983.
[4] Russell B. The problems of philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press;
1912.
[5] Lindley DV. Making decisions. 2nd ed. New York: Wiley; 1985.
[6] Pepper SC. World hypotheses: A study in evidence. Berkeley: University of
California Press; 1942.
[7] Sainsbury RM. Paradoxes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2009.
[8] Feynman RP, Leighton RB, Sands M. The Feynman Lectures on Physics, Volume
I: mainly mechanics, radiation, and heat. Pasadena, CA: California Institute of
Technology; 2010.
[9] Fisher RA. The arrangement of field experiments. J Ministry Agric Great Britain
1926;33:503e13.
[10] Robins JM. A new approach to causal inference in mortality studies with a
sustained exposure period: Application to control of the healthy worker
survivor effect. Math Model 1986;7:1393e512.
[11] Efron B, Tibshirani R. An introduction to the bootstrap. London: Chapman Hall;
1993.[12] Pearl J. On the consistency rule in causal inference: axiom, definition,
assumption, or theorem? Epidemiology 2010;21(6):872e5.
[13] Holland PW. Statistics and causal inference. JASA 1986;81:945e70.
[14] Bellman RE. Dynamic programming. Princeton: Dover; 1957.
[15] Robins JM, Rotnitzky A, Zhao LP. Estimation of regression coefficients when
some regressors are not always observed. JASA 1994;89:846e66.
[16] Tsiatis AA. Semiparametric theory and missing data. New York: Springer; 2006.
[17] Laplace PS. A philosophical essay on probabilities (Translated in 1902 by
Truscott, F.W., Emory, F. W.). New York: Wiley; 1814.
[18] Resnik MD. Choices: An introduction to decision theory. Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press; 1987.
